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River Basin Management (RBM) as an approach to sustainable water use has become the dominant model
of water governance. Its introduction, however, entails a fundamental realignment and rescaling of
water-sector institutions along hydrological boundaries. Creating such a new governance scale is inher-
ently political, and is being described as politics of scale. This paper analyzes how the politics of scale play
out in the institutionalization of RBM in Mongolia. It furthermore scrutinizes the role of the broader polit-
ical decentralization process in the introduction of RBM, an issue that has so far received little attention.
Finally, it assesses whether the river basin is an adequate water management scale in Mongolia.
This article ﬁnds that institutionalizing RBM in Mongolia is indeed a highly political negotiation process
that does not only concern the choice of the governance scale, but also its detailed institutional design. It
furthermore reveals that Mongolia’s incomplete political decentralization process has for a long time
negatively impacted the decentralization of water-related tasks and the implementation of RBM. How-
ever, the 2011 Budget Law and the 2012 Water Law provide for a ﬁscal strengthening of local govern-
ments and clearer sharing of responsibilities among the various different institutions involved in water
management. Nevertheless, only if the 2012 Water Law is complemented by adequate by-laws – and if
the newly created river basin institutions are adequately equipped – can RBM be effectively put into prac-
tice.
This article conﬁrms the usefulness of a politics-of-scale approach to understand scalar practices and
changes in water management. However, the article also argues for a broadening of the analytical per-
spective to take the interdependencies between changes in water governance and other political pro-
cesses, such as decentralization, into account.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has become
the dominant paradigm for water policies in many countries. The
concept is often understood to promote the river basin as the
appropriate scale for water governance (e.g. Dublin Principles
1992, Agenda 21, Chpt. 18.9 1992).1 A recent UN-survey of IWRM
implementation in 130 countries indicates that 87 per cent of these
countries have actually adopted River Basin Management (RBM),even though with a varying degree of success (United Nations
Environment Programme, 2012). While RBM is supposed to foster
holistic management of the resource in terms of vertical and hori-
zontal coordination among levels of government and government
sectors and to facilitate necessary stakeholder participation
(Mostert, 2000), its implementation is often challenging. In most
countries, water governance follows traditional multi-level jurisdic-
tions which rarely correspond to hydrologic boundaries. The imple-
mentation of RBM thus often requires far-reaching reforms in order
to realign institutions and organizations along the scales of river ba-
sins. Decentralization and participatory decision-making play a key
role in this process as they are believed to improve adaptation to lo-
cal conditions, enhance the use of local knowledge and institutions,
and ensure the greater involvement of stakeholders (Kemper et al.,
2010). Rescaling water governance and institutionalizing RBM is also
a highly political process because it inevitably shifts the decision-
making powers which are in place (Dombrowsky et al., 2010;
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socio-economic and political trade-offs (Kemper et al., 2010).
In Mongolia, these challenges of implementing River Basin
Management – as foreseen in its Water Laws of 2004 and 2012 –
are further complicated by the country’s overall condition of eco-
nomic and political transition. While the Mongolian economy
was long based on pastoralism and its political system dominated
by the Soviet inﬂuence, far-reaching changes have occurred since
the early 1990s and are still ongoing. The economic transition from
a socialist to a market economy is characterized by the boom in the
mining sector and by a signiﬁcant growth in livestock for cashmere
production. This also implies changes in land and water use: from
largely pastoral use and overall sustainable exploitation of natural
resources to current problems of resource depletion and pollution
as well as growing competition between pastoralism, agriculture
and the highly water-intensive mining sector (Priess et al., 2011).
The main pressure on water resources arises from the following
phenomena (e.g. Dolgorsuren et al. (2012: 353 ff.).): mining activ-
ities (causing pollution from release of toxic substances and ﬁne
particles, destruction of riparian vegetation and water overuse;
two inter-basin water transfer projects for water supply to mining
sites in the Gobi Desert are under preparation2) (Janzen et al., 2007;
Steckling et al., 2011); urbanization and the expansion of domestic
water use (resulting in the degradation of water quality); climate
change (including an increase of potential evaporation, a potential
increase in precipitation, changes in surface-water ﬂows and lake
levels, loss of soil moisture and land degradation) (Batima et al.,
2005; Dolgorsuren et al., 2012; Malsy et al., 2012; Menzel et al.,
2008; WWF Mongolia, 2007); the increase of livestock (causing land
degradation, erosion, bacterial contamination around urban areas,
nutrient pollution); the planned expansion of irrigated agriculture
(resulting in increasing competition over water resources) (Priess
et al., 2011); and deforestation (triggering reduced water storage
in catchments, changes in river regimes, erosion and the destruction
of riparian vegetation (ibid.).
Addressing these multiple and increasing challenges regarding
water resources and other environmental concerns requires strong
institutions. However, institutions and public administrations for
environmental governance at all levels are undergoing important
changes too.
The political transition includes a shift from a one-party system
and central planning to a parliamentary democracy and – slowly
progressing – decentralization (Lkhagvadorj, 2010). The incom-
plete political and ﬁscal decentralization (Lkhagvadorj, 2010;
Mearns, 2004) and insufﬁcient state control and legal systems
(Basandorj and Singh, 2008; Ykhanbai and Bulgan, 2006) have
complicated environmental governance since the 1990s. After the
dismantling of formal regulatory institutions for the sustainable
management of pastures in the 1990s, weakened traditional insti-
tutions have increasingly been unable to control land use, which
resulted in overgrazing and desertiﬁcation (Jamsranjav, 2009). In
the water sector, central planning through a water ministry during
the socialist era was followed by institutional uncertainties and an
administrative vacuum in the sector until major reforms were
decided in 2004. Monitoring, control and pricing of water use
and wastewater is largely insufﬁcient (Basandorj and Singh,
2008; Livingstone et al., 2009). Water use throughout the country
is also inefﬁcient due to lacking or outdated infrastructure, both in
the irrigation and in the sanitation sector.2 The currently major mining site is the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine in the
Gobi Desert operated by the world’s second largest mining company, the Anglo-
Australian Rio Tinto in partnership with the Mongolian Government and the Canadian
company Ivanhoe Mines. Many other Mongolian, Chinese, US, Australian and other
companies are active on other sites. Additionally, many formally registered small to
large-sized mining companies and a high number of informal, artisanal miners
operate in the country.However, legal reforms in recent years regarding land and
water use are beginning to restructure these sectors. In the face
of rapidly increasing environmental degradation and of the
above-mentioned trends towards higher demand and a diminish-
ing supply of water resources, the Mongolian government decided
to adopt the approach of IWRM as the guiding principle for water
governance. The 2004 Water Law included the creation of river
basin councils (RBCs) as participative stakeholder fora, and the
development of a national IWRM strategy. RBM shall be further
strengthened by the new Water Law of 2012 including the intro-
duction of river basin administrations (RBAs) as governmental
authorities. Even if water governance becomes increasingly decen-
tralized and participative, the institutionalization of RBM remains
challenging. As our study reveals, shortcomings of the decentral-
ization process have also negatively impacted river basin gover-
nance. Furthermore, the politics of scale, i.e. the politics behind
the choice of river basins as the new scale for water governance,
also play an important role in these dynamics (Horlemann and
Dombrowsky, 2012).
Against this background, this paper analyzes the introduction of
RBM in Mongolia as a rescaling process. De facto, three different
rescaling processes take place at the same time: the political
decentralization; the decentralization of water management tasks
to local authorities; and the implementation of RBM, including the
creation of river basin councils (RBCs) and river basin administra-
tions (RBAs). All three processes entail conﬂicts, negotiations and
trade-offs between and within scales. Building upon previous work
by Horlemann and Dombrowsky (2012) on problems of ﬁt and
interplay in the Mongolian water sector, this paper analyzes the
rescaling of water governance in the country and seeks to answer
the following research questions: (1) How does the political con-
text of decentralization affect the rescaling of water governance,
including the implementation of RBM?, (2) How do the politics
of scale play out in the institutionalization of RBM, including re-
lated conﬂicts on scale issues? and (3) Is RBM the appropriate scale
for managing water in Mongolia?
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the
theoretical approach of the analysis. Section 3 provides an over-
view of the material and method used in this case study. Section 4
presents the three different rescaling processes affecting the Mon-
golian water sector, namely political decentralization (4.1), the
decentralization of water management (4.2), and the implementa-
tion of RBM (4.3). Section 5 discusses these three rescaling pro-
cesses with respect to the three research questions and
interprets them in the light of the ‘‘scale debates’’. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper and points to the need for further research.2. Theoretical approach
Research on the links between the appropriation of nature and
the construction of scales essentially emerged in the 1990s from
human geography (for a historical overview see Howitt, 2000;
MacKinnon, 2010) and has provoked partly heated debates
between various different scholars – especially geographers, polit-
ical scientists and political ecologists – for over two decades
(Norman et al., 2012). Different understandings of the term ‘scale’
coexist within the social sciences alone (Marston, 2000;
Perramond, 2012). However, ‘scales’ are generally understood in
these debates as spatial concepts of socio-political phenomena,
whose continuous construction, deconstruction and reconstruction
express a ‘‘social struggle for power and control’’ (Swyngedouw,
1997). ‘Politics of scale’ refer to the strategic mobilization and
use of these scales for the interests of the different actors. While
environmental governance is a prominent ﬁeld of study in this con-
text (Boyle, 2002; Görg, 2007; Meadowcroft, 2002), a speciﬁc and
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water governance. ‘Scales’ can be deﬁned here as the territorial
unit of water governance and the representation thereof. In many
cases water-speciﬁc empirical case studies (Harris and Alatout,
2010; Swyngedouw, 1999; Thiel and Egerton, 2011) provide the
basis for theoretical reﬂections on the politics of scale in the sector.
From a conceptual and an empirical perspective, the implemen-
tation of IntegratedWater Resources Management and related new
modes of governance, such as the introduction of River Basin Man-
agement, lend themselves particularly well to the analysis of
rescaling processes. Such processes imply institutional change;
institutions are created or amended in order to enforce the claims
of IWRM or RBM or to deﬁne the rooms for political maneuver. This
does not only encompass aspects of the up- and downscaling of
political responsibilities and tasks between existing governance
levels but also the establishment of new organizations and institu-
tions. The creation of river basin organizations (RBOs) is maybe the
most prominent case in point as it requires a shift of decision-
making competencies from the scales of political jurisdictions to
the river basin.
As our case study on Mongolia shows, the analysis of scalar
practices in water management, including their construction,
negotiation and implementation, provides useful insights into the
conditions and change of water governance. The following ﬁndings
from previous studies are particularly relevant for the three
research questions dealt with here.
First, our research question relating to how the politics of scale
play out in the institutionalization of RBM is based on the evidence
that the process of implementing RBOs lends itself for scale ap-
proaches to the study of water governance because it shows the
inherently political character of both water management as such
(Allan, 2003; Mollinga, 2008) and of related scaling processes
(Swyngedouw, 1999). This implies the view that a river basin itself
is not naturally given but is a socially and politically constructed
scale (Feitelson and Fischhendler, 2009; Fischhendler, 2008;
Warner et al., 2008). Consequently, river basins are therefore also
considered as political units (Merrey and Cook, 2012), where RBOs
are also political bodies rather than merely technical management
units. Moreover, our research was inspired by ﬁndings conﬁrming
that the prevalence of conﬂict and negotiation about and between
scales inﬂuences water governance, as Swyngedouw (2010:9)
highlights: ‘‘[C]onﬂicts over the appropriate scale for organizing
water systems (local, river basin, national, trans-national) each
evoke different power geometries and may lead to radically differ-
ent socio-ecological conditions’’. The importance of looking at scale
as a process (Jonas, 2006; Norman et al., 2012), and not (only) as
the outcome of a process also proved to be a very useful observa-
tion for the analysis of the Mongolian case. MacKinnon’s argument
for a concept of ‘scalar politics’ which ‘‘replaces the implication
that the politics of scale are fundamentally about scale with the
idea that particular political projects and initiatives have scalar
aspects and repercussions’’ (MacKinnon, 2010:29) also proved to
be relevant here.
Second, our research question on the role of the process of polit-
ical decentralization is based on the insight that water governance
(in its forms, mechanisms, practices and outcomes) is always
embedded into a broader socio-political context, and that, while
centralization and decentralization processes apparently play a
role for RBM, knowledge about this interaction is still insufﬁcient.
Contextual factors are mentioned in papers on scalar approaches to
water management as ‘‘varied economic, social and cultural reali-
ties’’ or the ‘‘scalar modes of political life’’ (Meadowcroft, 2002).
Other authors also refer to broader strategic intentions of water
management when showing that the negotiation of hydro-scales
is closely related to state-building (Harris and Alatout, 2010) or
to the consolidation of state authority (Neumann, 2009). However,systematic assessments of the interplay between the governance
context and its dynamics on the one side and the implementation
of IWRM and RBM on the other are few.
Debates on polycentric and multi-level systems for effective
and legitimate environmental governance (Armitage, 2008;
Ostrom, 1999) or studies looking at environmental federalism
(Moss and Newig, 2010) do look at the broader governance con-
text, but seldom at its impact on the institutionalization or perfor-
mance of RBM. However, Hartje (2002) observes that, in Europe,
unitary governments have been more successful in introducing
RBM. Moss (2003) ﬁnds that in a federal country, such as Germany,
introducing River Basin Management under the Water Framework
Directive poses signiﬁcant challenges. On the other hand, Schlager
and Blomquist (2008) conclude that the federal system in the
United States has led to a variety of differently functioning, poly-
centric, federal types of water governance. Dinar et al. (2005) as-
sume that decentralization leads to more effective RBOs as it
increases their autonomy and empowers actors at the sub-national
level. They ﬁnd that the greater the extent of initial decentraliza-
tion in the basin was, the less time the institutionalization of the
RBM process took (Dinar et al., 2005). In line with this, they report
that ‘‘[t]he more top down the decentralization process was, the
smaller the extent of reported success . . .’’ (Dinar et al., 2005:
47). This however implies that, overall, the relationship between
centralization and decentralization and the establishment of RBM
is not yet well understood. Moreover, the general governance envi-
ronment in which RBM is implemented is often implicitly assumed
to be a stable environment and an independent variable – not as
the highly dynamic policy ﬁeld it often is, especially in countries
in transition.
In their comprehensive study on RBM, Kemper et al. 2010do
conﬁrm the importance of broader reforms of governmental struc-
tures for the creation or reform of RBM. They conclude that ‘‘the
development of RBM is affected (sometimes profoundly) by other
events and processes under way in the political economy’’ and that
‘‘the effects of simultaneous transitions varied’’ (idem: 233). How-
ever, these studies provide few details on the mutual inﬂuences of
the different processes and focus on the immediate relationship
between the RBOs and national institutions without considering
the inﬂuence of the decentralization of structures and policies
beyond the water sector. Hence, the impact of a changing institu-
tional environment on the implementation and performance of
RBM has been little researched. It is also notable that many studies
of RBM (including Kemper et al. 2010) appear to equate the decen-
tralization of water management with the introduction of RBM,
although a distinction needs to be made between the mere decen-
tralization of tasks from higher to existing lower-level political
jurisdictions, and the creation of new scales of governance such
as river basins and the respective institutions. The present study
therefore distinguishes between these two processes.
On the basis of the insights gained from the two ﬁrst research
questions, the third question asks whether River Basin Management
is the appropriate scale for water management in Mongolia. As
Kemper et al. (2010) show, RBOs were established in response to
two crucial concerns: to manage water in an integrated way (coor-
dinating water supply and demand while also preserving water
quality and the ecosystem) and to decentralize water management
at the lowest appropriate level. However, while river basin gover-
nance is being increasingly implemented worldwide in the context
of IWRM (United Nations Environment Programme, 2012),
researchers and practitioners alike also question the appropriate-
ness of this scale (Dixit et al., 2006; Warner et al., 2008). Key objec-
tions include the argument that economies and societies transcend
hydrological boundaries which leads to a complicated overlapping
of different scales for decision-making. It is argued that the River
Basin Management approach may not only fail due to political
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power to a river basin organization: it may also raise issues of
democratic representation and legitimacy (Dombrowsky, 2005;
Huitema and Meijerink, in press; Merrey, 2008; Warner et al.,
2008). In addition, Moss (2003, 2004) argues that while River Basin
Management may solve problems of ﬁt between hydrological and
political boundaries, it may also increase the problems of the insti-
tutional interplay of RBOs with existing jurisdictions. These various
different observations will guide the analysis of the Mongolian
case.
3. Material and methods
This paper is based on an extensive review of the relevant liter-
ature and empirical research. The literature review involved legal
documents and government programs as well as national and
international surveys. Qualitative interviews were conducted
within the framework of the International Water Research Alliance
Saxony (IWAS) project on water management in Mongolia, as well
as the project Integrated Water Resources Management in Central
Asia – Model Region Mongolia (MoMo), both ﬁnanced by the
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). Over
50 semi-structured, qualitative in-depth interviews were con-
ducted with representatives from national and local authorities,
river basin councils, business and non-governmental organiza-
tions, scientists, water users and donors between 2009 and 2013
(see Table 1). At the sub-national level, empirical research was car-
ried out in two Mongolian river basins. The Khar Lake-Khovd river
basin in north-west Mongolia was among the ﬁrst two river basins
in the country in which a river basin council (RBC) was institution-
alized (in 2009). In the Kharaa river basin in north-central Mongo-
lia, which is the area of multi-disciplinary analyses in the MoMo
project, an RBC was established in 2012.
4. Rescaling water governance in Mongolia
The Mongolian People’s Republic, founded in 1924, was
strongly inﬂuenced by the Soviet political system. After the break-
down of the communist regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe, a
largely peaceful democratic revolution in 1990 in Mongolia led to
a multi-party system and to the transition to a market economy.
The state and society are in many regards still undergoing a tran-
sition process where the rules, interests and decision-making
structures are being negotiated and decided upon. This includes
the overall process of political decentralization.
Section 4.1 gives a short overview of political decentralization
as a backdrop for our ﬁrst research question of ‘‘how politicalTable 1
Interview partners between 2009 and 2013.
Type of actor Interviewees (interviewed once or several times
National level 8 Representatives from the Mongolian Ministry o
Authority (WA), 2 from the National Water Com
Hydrology and Environment Monitoring (NAMH
Aimags/Soums 4 Soum Governors, 3 Heads of Soum Khurals, 2
Protected Area Administration, 2 Rangers
NGOs 4 Representatives from the World Wildlife Fund
Rivers and Lakes, 2 from the Asia Foundation, 1
Khovd/Buyant RBC 10 Members
Kharaa RBC 1 Vice-president, 3 members
Tuul RBC 2 Members
Orkhon RBC 1 Member
Scientists 5 Mongolian professors
Foreign cooperation agencies and
consultants
4 Consultants, 2 representatives from Swiss Dev
(GIZ), 3 from the United Nations Development P
Bankdecentralization affects water governance and the implementation
of RBM’’. Section 4.2 analyzes the reallocation of water manage-
ment tasks among different ministries and the delegation of tasks
to local authorities, and Section 4.3 the implementation of River
Basin Management in order to understand how the politics of scale
play out in RBM, and whether RBM is the appropriate approach to
water governance in Mongolia (2nd and 3rd research questions).
The analysis of the interplay of the three processes is presented
in Section 5.4.1. Political decentralization in Mongolia
The following section details those elements of the process of
administrative and political decentralization which directly or
indirectly inﬂuence water governance in Mongolia. The country
is divided into 21 provinces (Aimags) (plus the capital Ulaanbaatar
which is administrated separately and divided into districts and
Khoroos), 331 districts (Soums) and 1573 municipalities (Baghs)
(Lkhagvadorj 2010: 76). The provinces, the capital and the districts
have own local parliaments (Khural) which are elected every
4 years. In addition, ‘general meetings of citizens’ are held in the
Baghs and Khoroos.
The organization of the public administration has undergone
several reforms since the 1990s and responsibilities for service
provision including water have been increasingly shifted from
the central to the local level. However, the government and the leg-
islation of the early 2000s were heavily criticized for adhering to
top-down governance and for providing too little scope for action
to local governments. The lack of abilities to raise revenues at
the local level and limited capacities hampered effective decentral-
ization in the country for a long period of time (Lkhagvadorj, 2010).
Until recently, local governance was based on the Budget Law of
2002 and on the Public Sector Management and Finance Law of
the same year. Both laws included an important delegation of
administrative tasks to local governments, but their ﬁscal and
the decision-making competencies were insufﬁcient to carry out
these tasks.
In 2013, a new Integrated Budget Law came into force. It is seen
as a response to the increasing gap between the strong economic
growth of the country on one side and urgent needs and increasing
claims for local development on the other (Lkhagvadorj, 2012). The
law improves the consistency and comprehensiveness of the
decentralization process, deﬁning the functions of each adminis-
trative level more clearly. It is expected that local governments will
have much larger budgets because of a modiﬁcation in the reallo-
cation of budgets from the national to the local level. A new aspect
of the Budget Law is the planned increase of citizens’ participation)
f the Environment and Green Development (MEGD), 4 from the Mongolian Water
mittee (NWC), 1 from Mongol Us, 1 from the National Agency for Meteorology,
EM), 2 from the Civil Will Green Party
representatives from environmental departments at Soum level, 1 from the
(WWF), 1 from the Ongi River Movement, 1 from the Mongolian Movement for
from the Environment and Development Association JASIL
elopment Cooperation, 1 from the German Agency for International Cooperation
rogramme, 2 from the Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW), 2 from the World
3 At the time of writing this article, the by-laws on the exact modes of
implementation had not yet been approved.
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problems persist which are beyond the scope of the Integrated
Budget Law. First, local governments still have only limited inﬂu-
ence in the budget planning and approval process since they may
make proposals on the budget, but then have to comply with the
allocation. Second, according to several local expert interviews,
local governments do not have the technical, managerial and pro-
cedural competencies to adequately plan for and spend the money,
nor to implement the participatory approaches required (2012,
pers. comm.). Third, while it is envisioned that enforcement capac-
ities will be increased at local levels, it remains to be seen in what
way this will take place.
The relevant literature mentions several reasons for the slow
progress of the decentralization process in the ﬁrst 20 years of
the democratic transition, such as implementation through a
top-down approach and the lack of an integrated strategy
(Lkhagvadorj, 2010). The overall transition context of Mongolia
and mental models from the socialist past may also explain some
of the difﬁculties. As Mearns highlights in his paper on Mongolia,
this situation is similar to other post-socialist countries and ‘‘the
backdrop of institutional ﬂux and uncertainty that characterizes
all post-socialist transitions has not so far been conducive to fos-
tering the predictability in expectations among social actors that
democratic decentralization reforms demand’’ (Mearns, 2004:
141). Moreover, established elites may try to impede change per-
ceived as a threat to their inﬂuence, and the government may favor
centralist structures in order to effectively control national and
international revenues (Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe, 2004).
4.2. Reform and decentralization of water management
The dismantling of the Water Ministry in 1986 and of the
remaining water administration during the transformation in
1990 led to a fragmentation of water governance at national level
(Basandorj and Singh, 2008). The former Water Ministry’s respon-
sibilities were reassigned to at least six other ministries. In the face
of the increasing problems of water pollution and rising consump-
tion, the water sector then underwent several reform processes
aiming at a more coherent and integrated approach to water
resources management and a more precise organization of the
related tasks (see Horlemann and Dombrowsky 2012 for important
reforms up to the year 2010).
These reforms included the establishment of the National Water
Committee (NWC) in 1999 which is responsible for the coordina-
tion of water-related activities of the now thirteen relevant minis-
tries; the setting up of a Water Authority (WA) responsible for the
implementation of IWRM from 2005 to 2012; the devolution of a
number of water management tasks to sub-national governments
in the Water Law of 2004; and the establishment of river basin
councils as of 2009 and of river basin administrations as of 2012.
Since the recent reform of 2012, the inter-ministerial Water Coun-
cil has been responsible for the provision of permits for the use of
water resources and related research. At the ministerial level, a
speciﬁc sub-unit of the Mongolian Ministry of the Environment
and Green Development (MEGD)’s Department for Policy Imple-
mentation was created in 2012 for River Basin Management.
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the various different actors involved
in water governance.
Problems of horizontal interplay persisted for a long time, given
that the political power of theministry in charge of the environment
(which was renamed the Ministry of the Environment and Green
Development (MEGD) in 2012) towards other inﬂuential ministries
was very limited and resources for the implementation of its duties
were largely insufﬁcient (Rep. Water Authority 2009, pers. comm.).
It remains to be seen if the recent changes, including the promotion
of the MEGD to one of the four general orientation ministries,greater ﬁnancial resources and the subordination of the NWC under
the direct auspices of the Prime Minister instead of the MEGD, will
help it to become more inﬂuential. The inﬂuence of the newly ap-
pointedMinister who is also the leader of the Green Party CivilWill,
the doubling of theMinistry’s employees, and theMEGD’s responsi-
bility for approving any large investment projects with potential ef-
fects on the environment also point in this direction.
With respect to the decentralization of water management
tasks, the 2004 and 2012 Water Laws made province and district
governors responsible for the implementation of measures related
to the use, protection and restoration of water resources as well
as the construction of facilities. Municipal governors are responsi-
ble for the enforcement of legislation on water use. Provincial
parliaments are to adopt water management programs submitted
by the RBAs and governors and approve their budgets. Provincial
and district departments of the environment, branches of the
MEGD, are responsible for the implementation of environmental
policies based on the governors’ orders. In contrast to the text
of the Water Law, interviews revealed that environmental inspec-
tors employed by the General Agency for Specialized Inspection
(GASI) are (also) responsible for the enforcement of environmen-
tal laws. Since 2012, the environmental administration at the
community (bagh) level can set the prices and sign the permit
for water consumption when this does not exceed 50 m3/day.
Volumes between 50 and 100 m3/day require a permit from the
river basin administrations and from the provincial governor-
level which also set prices for these quantities. Water consump-
tion of more than 100 m3/day needs to be given a permit by
the MEGD which also ﬁxes the price for these users. Moreover,
the price for water use through the mining sector (which repre-
sents a large and growing proportion of water use) is to be ﬁxed
by the National Parliament. Furthermore, the new 2012 Water
Law aims at improving monitoring, through the creation of a cen-
tral databank and data collection. In addition, consideration is
being given to transferring the responsibility for the enforcement
of sector laws from the General Agency for Specialized Inspection
(GASI) to the respective line ministries.3
So far, a key problem has been that local institutions have nei-
ther been sufﬁciently qualiﬁed nor have they had adequate means
for monitoring water use or for designing and implementing water
management measures (Dolgorsuren et al., 2012; Tortell et al.,
2008). Interviewees from environmental departments at the pro-
vincial and district level admitted that ‘‘Controlling illegal water
exploitation is very difﬁcult and illegal wells can easily obtain an
authorization when they are detected. (. . .) As for water pricing,
the laws are there, but they are not implemented’’ (environmental
inspector in Bornuur Soum, Kharaa river basin, 2012, pers. comm.).
Overall, it can be stated that the formal decentralization of
water services has been insufﬁciently implemented since the adop-
tion of related laws in 2004. However, in spite of persisting difﬁcul-
ties and uncertainties (Houdret et al., in press) recent reforms may
improve ﬁnancial and technical means and encourage the political
will to actually implement related measures at local levels.4.3. Institutionalization of River Basin Management
Next to the decentralization of water services, the implementa-
tion of RBM is the second rescaling process in the water sector. In
order to understand how the politics of scale play(ed) out in this
process and whether the river basin is the appropriate level for
water governance in Mongolia, the main steps of this evolution
are presented below.
Fig. 1. Key actors in Mongolia’s water sector (only water-related entities are shown. Source: authors’ own compilation.)
5 The Dutch development cooperation supported the Water Authority in the
development of a nationwide IWRM strategy between 2009 and 2012. At the river
basin-level, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Coping with Desertiﬁcation Project
(Swiss Development Agency), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and The Asia Foundation (TAF) are conducting various different water management
and water governance activities. The German Federal Ministry of Education and
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lia’s 2004 Water Law adopted the approach of IWRM and called for
the identiﬁcation of river basins and the establishment of river
basin councils as multi-stakeholder fora in order to increase public
participation in water use and protection. Since 2009, 18 RBCs have
been formally established, four of which were considered to be
operational until their abolishment in 2013 (see below) (MEGD
2012 and MEDG 2013, pers. comm.)4.
However, given that the 2004 Water Law left many answers
regarding the water administration at sub-national level open,
since 2009 two different models have been discussed to strengthen
water administration at sub-national level: either to strengthen
provincial and district administrations (e.g. by having their own
water departments) or to establish river basin administrations at
basin level (NWC 2010, pers. comm.). In the end, the decision
was taken to strengthen governance at river basin scale. As a con-
sequence, the new Water Law of 2012 called for the establishment
of RBAs as public administrations in addition to RBCs and trans-
ferred some of the latters’ tasks to the RBAs. In 2013, RBAs were
planned to be established in the four basins where active RBCs
had already previously existed and in eleven others where
improved knowledge of water resources and better management
are urgently needed. The remaining administrations are to follow
in the coming years. In 2013 a new Regulation on RBCs was
adopted.
The present section uses the issues of contention and conﬂicts
around the implementation of RBM as an entry point to under-
stand the politics of scale in and around the process of RBM imple-4 These four are the ones supported by donors: the RBCs of Khovd/Buyant, Orkhon,
Tuul and Kharaa.mentation. Based on our analyses, the following ﬁve key issues of
contention can be distinguished: (1) the understanding of IWRM/
RBM and the deﬁnition of the river basins; (2) membership and
participation in the RBC; (3) the mandate and responsibilities of
the RBCs and RBAs; (4) the ﬁnancing of River Basin Management;
and (5) the legal status of the RBCs and RBAs.4.3.1. How IWRM/RBM and the deﬁnition of river basins are
understood
In their extensive study on decentralization of water gover-
nance, Kemper et al. (2010) highlight the importance of long-term
political commitment for the success of RBM since it takes a long
time for changes to be implemented. In Mongolia, however, (as
elsewhere) the way IWRM and RBM are understood seems to dif-
fer considerably between different actors involved. Many foreign
experts and institutions have been involved in promoting IWRM,
and most of the projects to implement RBM have been supported
through foreign funding5. However, according to interviewees,
mainly high-level Mongolian water professionals have also advo-
cated adopting the IWRM concept (NAMHEM 2010, pers. comm.).
After the Water Ministry was closed in 1986, a community ofResearch (BMBF) has been funding a research project on IWRM in the Kharaa River
Basin (Integrated Water Resources Management in Central Asia – Model Region
Mongolia (MoMo). The World Bank is supporting the creation of river basin councils
and water monitoring in the Gobi region (see below).
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25 years, this epistemic community or group of experts reportedly
stayed in contact and continued to pursue their interests in im-
proved water management and cooperation across different
water-using sectors (WA and NWC 2012, pers. comm.). In the face
of the rapidly increasing water problems in the country, public pol-
icies took up the issue again with the core group of this community
supporting this dynamic process. Today, it is still active in key posi-
tions in the sector including many national-level administrations
(MEGD 2013, pers. comm.). Hence, it would be wrong in the Mon-
golian case to attribute the adoption of IWRM and RBM only to
external actors.
Nonetheless, research results reveal that these different Mongo-
lian and foreign players did, and do not necessarily act on the basis
of a common understanding of IWRM. For example, while the then
deputy head of the Water Authority perceived an ‘‘integrated
water pricing system’’ as the most important step towards IWRM
(WA 2009, pers. comm.), a consultant to the Water Authority high-
lighted the ‘‘triangle of water management, land management and
ecology’’ (consultant 2009, pers. comm.). An interviewee from the
Mongolian University of Science and Technology (MUST), again,
understands IWRM primarily as the modernization of technical
facilities. The 2012Water Law dedicates a separate article to IWRM
(Art. 4), but does not deﬁne it either. The key concerns of IWRM in
the law seem to be that the resource is used in a sustainable and
proﬁtable way and that River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs),
river basin councils, and river basin administrations should be
established (Art. 4.3–4.10). However, even if no explicit common
understanding of the deﬁnition of IWRM exists, an overall shared
concern about the importance of integrated water management
prevails which supposedly facilitated the implementation. As an
interviewee states: ‘‘IWRM is not something you can touch, it is
a way of doing things, it is a philosophy’’ (consultant 2012, pers.
comm.).
Apart from a lack of an exact deﬁnition of IWRM, there was an
agreement that river basins as such needed to be identiﬁed. In
Mongolia, no common understanding of the borders, scope, and
ultimate number of basins within the country existed. A consul-
tant to the Water Authority stated: ‘‘... [E]ven internally we are
discussing what the size of a basin should be. Of course, there
are many criteria; you would normally expect from the Water
Authority that the hydrological criteria are the guiding criteria
initially’’ (consultant 2009, pers. comm.). However, the 29 river
basins agreed upon by the Ministry of Environment were not only
chosen on hydrological criteria but also on the basis of economic
implications. Economically relevant rivers were granted the status
of a discrete river basin even when, from a hydrological perspec-
tive, they actually belonged to larger catchments. Fig. 2 shows (1)
the 29 river basins as deﬁned by the WA and the water profes-
sionals’ proposal and (2) the 16 river basins according to hydro-
logical criteria only.
Moreover, because of the lack of surface water in the Gobi Des-
ert, no river basins could be deﬁned for this large part of the coun-
try. Due to the increasing mining activities, precisely in this region,
and their drastic impact on water availability and pollution, it was
decided to strengthen local water governance through the creation
of RBCs as in the remaining parts of the country. As knowledge on
groundwater aquifers was insufﬁcient to determine the catchment
areas and since no surface water existed in this region, the RBCs
were deﬁned on the basis of the provincial boundaries (WA
2012, pers. comm.).
Both examples – the lack of a common understanding of IWRM
and of the identiﬁcation of the river basins’ boundaries – conﬁrm
the political nature of the process of IWRM implementation and
provide useful insights into the politics of scale which will be fur-
ther detailed in Section 5.4.3.2. Membership in the river basin council
Membership in the river basin councils was and is a critical
issue of RBM in Mongolia and the different positions on this topic
illustrate the politics of scale in the process. According to theWater
Law of 2004, an RBC was supposed to consist of up to 15 members
representing relevant government entities, main water-using sec-
tors, NGOs and academia (Art. 19.4). Furthermore, according to
the Ministerial Regulation No. 187 of 2006, which gave further pro-
visions on RBCs, every district which was crossed by the river was
allowed to appoint a representative. The law did not elaborate on
the actual procedure of initiating the establishment of a council.
Regulation No. 187 states that those who wish to found an RBC
should submit a request to Water Authority (for rivers crossing
provinces) or Province Environmental Department (for rivers with-
in provinces).
These provisions have led to uncertainties as to the process of
establishing an RBC as well as to its composition. In the Khovd
basin, where the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) facilitated the pro-
cess of establishing an RBC through a series of consultations and
a stakeholder meeting with 100 participants, considerable conﬂict
arose as to who could be represented in the RBC. The Khovd river
basin covers 29 districts, 16 of which lie in one province. During
the process of establishing the RBC, single representatives of this
province claimed their right for a seat in the council, a request
which could not be fulﬁlled due to a limit of 15 members in total.
It was therefore argued that the law should be adjusted: either the
number of seats should be more ﬂexible, or the rights of the dis-
tricts to appoint one representative each should be qualiﬁed
(Khovd RBC 2010, pers. comm.). Besides the restriction because
of the number of seats, local power relations between different
ethnic groups also played a role (WWF 2010, 2012, pers. comm.).
No solution could be found, and in the end the candidates were
referred to the MEGD who took a decision and appointed the mem-
bers with WWF support (WWF 2009, pers. comm.). The result was
that decisions on the majority of the councils’ positions were taken
by government representatives, and that the Khovd RBC had no
representatives from the water-using sectors or the local popula-
tion. In contrast, in the Kharaa basin, in the absence of a bottom-
up initiative or a donor-facilitated process, the members of the
RBC were nominated by the Ministry of Environment in 2011.
However, according to its members, the nominations mostly relied
on recommendations by the Water Authority and local environ-
mental agencies or the local governments and civil society (mem-
bers of the Kharaa RBC 2012, pers. comm.). The Kharaa RBC
included a local NGO, but government agencies still dominated
the council. The implication was that RBCs were primarily bodies
for the coordination of relevant government institutions, but not
necessarily multi-stakeholder fora or a means for comprehensive
stakeholder participation as intended by the 2004 Water Law.
Legislation on the RBCs considerably changed with the new
Water Law in 2012. River basin administrations (RBAs) were cre-
ated as governmental authorities and took over many of the RBCs’
tasks, while the RBCs were to serve as participatory stakeholder
fora for advising the RBAs and communicating the citizens’ con-
cerns. As for the membership issue, the former regulation was
abolished and a new by-lawwas issued in 2013 which foresaw that
councils were now to consist of a chair, a secretary, and 31–45
members, depending on the size of the respective basin. One-third
of the council’s members were to represent public administrations
and parliaments of the basin, one-third NGOs and civil society, and
the last third water users, including industrial and agricultural
companies (MEGD 2013, pers. comm.). The establishment of an
RBC and the appointment of its members would always require
the approval of the MEGD and were to be based on an agreement
between the local administration and the RBA. In 2013, all existing
RBCs were dissolved and are to be newly constituted once the
Fig. 2. River basins in Mongolia as deﬁned by politico-economic criteria (1) and hydrological criteria (2). (Map 1 provided by Mr. Batbayar, Water Authority of Mongolia, map
2 by Professor Basandorj of the Mongolian University of Science and Technology.) Source: Water Authority and MUST.
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2013, pers. comm.).4.3.3. Mandates and responsibilities of river basin organizations
The mandates and responsibilities assigned to river basin orga-
nizations (RBOs) are a crucial factor in the politics of scale in RBM
since they inﬂuence power relations at the river basin-level and
beyond. According to the Water Law of 2004, river basin councils
were to be established ‘‘to engage citizens in local water manage-
ment for protection of water resources, its effective use and resto-
ration’’ (Art. 19.1). The Water Law (2004) furthermore assigned the
RBC planning, monitoring, and advisory tasks. Among these was
the duty to develop a River Basin Management Plan (RBMP) to be
approved by local parliaments, to monitor its implementation,
and to give procedural recommendations to local administrations
on infringements of water-related legislation. The law also
assigned RBCs the right to withhold water-use licenses for 14 days.
Given that the RBC is a consultative body that does not work on
a permanent basis, this fairly broad range of tasks raised consider-
able concern among those involved in the implementation. It was
furthermore noted that the Water Law entitled the RBC to suspend
licenses for water use, but it did not say how this right should be
applied (WWF 2010, pers. comm.). Interviewees argued that clear
rules for the division of labor between actors would be needed,
as well as the clariﬁcation of decision-making powers (Dutch
IWRM Project; Khovd RBC 2010, pers. comm.). Several intervie-
wees mentioned that the RBCs would need a stronger legal hold
in order to impede arbitrary actions from other actors such as min-
ing agencies (WWF; Green Party; Provincial Environment and
Tourism Ofﬁce 2010, pers. comm.). It was also mentioned that
there would be the danger that people might develop expectations
that an RBC would not be able to fulﬁll. This would eventually lead
to a loss of political and public support, and the RBCs would end up
as ‘‘paper tigers’’ (WWF 2009, pers. comm.). Hence, there remained
considerable uncertainties as to what the RBC could and should do,
and interviewees agreed that this issue needed to be addressed.
A number of these uncertainties were indeed addressed in the
Water Law of 2012, while others continue to persist. Given the
decision to establish RBAs in addition to RBCs in the 2012 law, sev-
eral of the original tasks of RBCs were allocated to the RBAs.
According to the new law, it is not the RBC any more, but the
RBA which is responsible for developing an RBMP and for coordi-
nating and monitoring its implementation. Additionally, the RBA
is responsible for running a databank on the river basin and is
involved in issuing and terminating water and wastewater licenses
and in determining water fees. However, the RBA does not (at leastso far) have a mandate or a means for law enforcement and thus
depends on other governmental bodies for this critical issue. In
the case of persisting deﬁcits in enforcement, this may seriously
affect the institution’s legitimacy and capacities for improving
IWRM.
In contrast, an RBC is to assure the cooperation of stakeholders,
transmit the citizens’ needs with respect to water resources to the
RBA, and advise the RBA on the elaboration and implementation of
the RBMP. In line with its tasks according to the 2004Water Law, it
is still responsible for the monitoring of water uses and the fulﬁll-
ment of environmental impact assessment provisions and enforce-
ment of water protection zones.
Hence, in future, the RBA can be expected to play a crucial role
in the administration of river basins, and the RBC may increase
stakeholder participation. However, given that RBC members are
not necessarily water experts and that they are not reimbursed
for their work in RBCs, charging them with monitoring remains
unrealistic (consultant 2012, pers. comm.) The Regulation on RBCs
of 2013 conﬁrms the tasks of RBCs as in the 2012 Water Law.4.3.4. Financing River Basin Management
Financing is another important issue in the politics of scale
since it determines the working ability of RBOs and the implemen-
tation of measures at this level. The Water Law of 2004 made no
provisions in terms of the ﬁnancing of the RBCs. Regulation No.
187 stated that the ﬁnancing of the RBCs should be assured
through water-use fees, ﬁnancial support and donations, but this
did not include any precise procedures or allocation mechanisms.
At that time, according to the Law on Water Fees, fees were very
low, no fees were charged for water use in agriculture, and the col-
lection of fees was very incomplete. Hence, water fees were not a
sufﬁcient and reliable basis for the funding of RBCs. A representa-
tive of the WA stated in 2009 that ‘‘the river basin councils’ ﬁnan-
cial base is not clear. This is maybe the most important point for an
organization.’’ Although the central government is not mentioned
in Regulation No. 187, various interviewees stated that it should
be the main source of funds (Khovd RBC; WWF; WA 2010, pers.
comm.). As such, the source of funding for the RBCs remained very
vague until 2012 and only those RBCs that received foreign support
were able to begin functioning.
The 2012 Water Law clearly states that while RBAs will have
their own budget, RBCs will not be ﬁnanced through the public
budget. The new regulation on RBCs of 2013 mentions that these
may get contracts from the public sector or donors to implement
certain activities, but neither is it clear what type of activities this
applies to and where the funds are to come from, nor is ﬁnancing
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ing, it was envisioned that in future water-user fees would be
partly used for the ﬁnancial support of the RBC chair and secretary,
but this was still under discussion (NWC 2013, pers. comm.).
As several tasks are assigned to this body it is still questionable
whether it can carry them all out without external funding.
According to local experts and policy makers, these will have to
be ﬁnanced by donors or through the local development funds,
which are expected to increase due to the recent reform of the
Budget Law. However, neither the Budget Law nor the Water
Law provide for any precise regulation on this issue.4.3.5. The legal status of river basin organizations
The legal status is another major issue of concern in the politics
of scale since this also determines the scope of action of RBOs
including, for example, their access to funding and their ability to
implement and enforce measures. The legal status of the RBCs
was not deﬁned in the 2004 Water Law and thus became an issue
of contention, since it was not clear if they should act as a govern-
ment agency, an NGO, or as a private company. As a member of the
Khovd RBC (2010, pers. comm.) reported, the registration with the
Tax Authority was also problematic without a decision on the legal
status. In a ﬁrst phase, many RBCs were therefore registered as
GONGOs (government-organized non-governmental organizations
which do not necessarily get governmental support but beneﬁt
from a clear legal status) (WWF 2009, pers. comm.). Interviewees
in the Khvod basin had different opinions on which legal form
would be appropriate for the RBCs. A member of the Khovd RBC,
for example, argued that RBCs should be governmental organiza-
tions for the next 5–10 years. He emphasized the priority need
for proper water legislation and its enforcement, which would be
best assured by a strong and accepted governmental organization.
According to him, the habits and mindsets of people towards the
environment and environmental legislation would need to im-
prove during this time so that RBCs could become NGOs later on
(Khovd RBC 2010, pers. comm.). Other interviewees argued that
framing RBCs as government organizations would help to secure
their budget (Buyant RBC 2010, pers. comm.). This debate also re-
ﬂects the perceived need for a strengthened water administration.
The 2012Water Law clariﬁed that RBAs would be established as
part of the public administration, and that RBCs should be consid-
ered as NGOs without governmental funding (WWF 2012, pers.
comm.).5. Discussion
The present section discusses the empirical results presented in
Section 4 with respect to the three initial research questions.5.1. Political decentralization affects the rescaling of water governance
Our ﬁrst research question asked how the political decentraliza-
tion process in Mongolia affected the rescaling of the water sector
including the introduction of RBM. The insight into the Mongolian
case conﬁrms our initial observation that ‘‘the governance context
matters’’. The analysis in Section 4 shows that the decentralization
of water management tasks can be directly linked to the political
decentralization process. At the same time, the introduction of
RBM has to be seen as an additional reform step in the water sector
reform that is not directly linked to the decentralization process. It
is however inﬂuenced by the global discourse on IWRM and is
intended to increase stakeholder participation in water manage-
ment. Despite this, the fact that the political decentralization
process has remained incomplete over a long period of time hasnegatively affected water governance in three major respects: leg-
ally, ﬁscally/economically, and politically.
From a legal perspective, there have been, and still are, consider-
able uncertainties with respect to the allocation of competencies
among water management institutions at sub-national level (RBCs
and RBAs), provincial and district departments of line ministries
and local governments. The new Water Law (2012), the law on
the use of natural resources (2012) and new environmental regula-
tions address many of these deﬁcits, inter alia, by creating RBAs as
specialist water administrations at the sub-national level. How-
ever, by-laws still need to be elaborated for determining the legal
mandate of the various different institutions and the relations
among them.
From a ﬁscal and economic perspective, the weaknesses of the
broader decentralization process directly affected local water gov-
ernance in several regards since no adequate budget was available
for implementing local water and environmental governance. This
conﬁrms the results of research in river basins of other countries
highlighting the crucial role of ﬁscal decentralization and the allo-
cation of water-related revenues to RBOs for their performance
(Kemper et al., 2010; Mody, 2004; Moss and Newig, 2010). In Mon-
golia, RBM was not ﬁnancially supported by the state at all until
2012, and the budgets of provincial and district administrations
were insufﬁcient for the required water management tasks. In
future, RBAs will be ﬁnancially supported by the state but the
ﬁnancing for the implementation of their activities, such as
research as the basis for designing RBMPs and measures for their
implementation, is still uncertain. According to interviews in
2013, depending of the size of the investment this may stem from
local development funds (to be ﬁnanced through the new Budget
Law), allocations from the central budget, donor contributions
(MEGD 2013, pers. comm.) or potentially from fees for water use
and pollution. While RBCs will not be ﬁnancially supported by the
state, one idea is that the RBC’s chairperson and secretary should
be funded by a share of the future water and wastewater fees
(NWC 2013, pers. comm.). In general, from an economic perspec-
tive, the idea that RBMwould be partly paid bywater andwastewa-
ter fees is commendable as it creates a direct accountability
mechanism between those who pay for and those who beneﬁt from
RBM (which corresponds to the principle of ﬁscal equivalence in
economics (Olson, 1969)). However, this implies that the viability
of RBM also depends on the successful implementation of the
new provisions on water pricing which will remain a signiﬁcant
challenge, given the slow progress in raising water and wastewater
fees, and the still low revenue collection. The 2012 laws foresee an
increase in water and the introduction of wastewater fees. How-
ever, the size of this increase is still to be ﬁxed in a by-law. The topic
had already been negotiated in the National Parliament four times,
however, by August 2013 without an agreement having been
reached (NWC 2013, pers. comm.). At least revenue collection has
already signiﬁcantly increased in 2013, albeit from very low levels
(ibid.). Finally, the Budget Law of 2011 envisions that citizen coun-
cils will determine priorities for investments up to certain amounts.
This raises the question of how this process will ﬁt into the dynam-
ics involved in setting up RBMPs by RBAs in consultationwith RBCs.
At the political level, environmental institutions including those
responsible for water management have so far had a weak position
compared to stronger players such as the mining or construction
sectors (environmental inspector, Bornuur Soum, Kharaa river
basin 2012, pers. comm.). This is also due to the incomplete decen-
tralization process, entailing inadequate legal mandates and bud-
gets as well as the limited political weight of local governments
in the policy and budgetary processes (Lkhagvadorj, 2012). Recent
reforms diminishing the number of regulative and implementing
authorities, including those in the environmental sector aim at
improving this situation.
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highly inﬂuential, both in terms of the ‘political spirit’ in which
RBM takes place and in very practical terms of tasks, decision-
making structures and ﬁnancial questions. Besides vested interests
and disagreement on the preferred use of Mongolia’s water
resources (mining versus environmental protection), it is the
incomplete decentralization process that has – at least so far –
hampered effective water management in Mongolia.
While it seems that progress in the political decentralization
process has eased the conditions for RBM, given the increased bud-
gets for the local level and for RBAs, it should be emphasized that,
based on the Mongolian case, we cannot ﬁnally answer the ques-
tion whether a centrally or a decentrally organized state is more
conducive towards RBM. Our ﬁndings, however, show that an
incomplete decentralization process has not been conducive
towards effective RBM. The simultaneity of these two related
rescaling processes – the political decentralization including water
management tasks and the designation of river basins as a new
entity for water governance – has so far not been extensively
researched, neither from a scale perspective nor in publications
on the decentralization of water management.
5.2. Politics of scale in the institutionalization of River Basin
Management
Our second research question was how the politics of scale play
out in the institutionalization of RBM in Mongolia. As the present
analysis shows, river basin governance is still a process in the mak-
ing. The case study with its numerous issues of contention in the
implementation of RBM conﬁrms however that rescaling is
about the ‘‘negotiation of tension, conﬂict and contradiction’’
(Swyngedouw, 2010: 21) and that only in these negotiations can
agreements on new governance scales be found and subsequently
put into practice. It also highlights that introducing RBM is not
primarily a technical process, but rather inherently political.
Even before the actual design of RBM was debated in Mongolia,
the designation of the basins and their boundaries was controver-
sial. In the end, it did not only take hydrological, but also economic
and political factors into account and was thus tight to questions of
power and inﬂuence. The problems with the identiﬁcation of river
basins’ boundaries conﬁrm the observation of researchers that riv-
er basins are not naturally given entities but politically and socially
constructed (Merrey and Cook, 2012; Schlager and Blomquist,
2008; Warner et al., 2008). The vested interests and power strug-
gles linked to this rescaling process are also visible when it comes
to the role of water governance for state-building. During a long
period of neglect of the water sector by public policies, largely
uncontrolled private mining companies exploited and polluted
water resources. Due to related problems of pollution and overex-
ploitation, as well as still increasing demand, the resource gained a
highly strategic value and is now increasingly regulated. In the
light of these developments, reform of water regulations and the
creation of RBAs as governmental agencies can also be interpreted
as a re-appropriation of the water resources by the state and as a
means to ensure state control over strategically relevant territories,
such as in the Gobi Desert.
Power struggles were obvious in the negotiations on the mem-
bership of RBCs, at least in the case of the Khovd basin, where many
more players were interested in participating than seats available.
This struggle was about the inﬂuence of upstream, midstream and
downstream users; about the relative power of different ethnic
groups; and about the relative weight of public, private and civil
society actors. In the end, the composition of the RBC, as selected
by the Water Authority, sought to balance differing public sector
interests in the basins, but this came at the expense of private
and civil society actors. In that sense, the formerly agreed scaleof RBM as a forum for public participation in water management
was reconstructed as a platform for public-sector coordination –
an evolution somehow conﬁrmed and rectiﬁed by the creation of
RBAs later on. In the case of the Kharaa basin, the representation
of different actors as mentioned in the 2004 Water Law somehow
seemed more balanced. However, in this case, RBC members were
appointed in a top-down process. This procedure raises the ques-
tion of whether this is the most appropriate approach towards
organizing stakeholder participation. On the other hand, one may
also ask why no RBC emerged in a bottom-up process in the Kharaa
basin. Once established, in both cases different actors actively used
and strategically mobilized the new scale introduced for voicing
their concerns and potentially enforcing their inﬂuence. However,
the fact that the RBC in the Kharaa (as well as in other basins) was
not established in a bottom-up process, shows that the opportuni-
ties of the new scale of river basins should not be overestimated. A
potential reason is that no budgets were allocated for RBCs in the
2004 Water Law.
The imprecise designations of the mandate, ﬁnancial basis and
legal status of the RBC in the 2004 Water Law led to new political
uncertainty and related negotiations. They may not only indicate
technical deﬁcits, but rather translate a political uncertainty about
the form, functions and room to maneuver to be assigned to the
new institutions. In particular, the different opinions about the fu-
ture legal status of RBCs reﬂect the tensions in the understanding
of the RBC as a forum for negotiations of different public bodies
on the one hand, and as a forum for public participation in water
management on the other. At the same time, there was a broad
consensus that something needed to be done about these uncer-
tainties which was even shared – and publicly admitted – by
national water institutions, such as the Water Authority and the
National Water Committee.
The agreement on the new Water Law, which considerably
improves the institutionalization of RBM, can be seen as a success
of the negotiations at the governmental level and as a sign of new
conﬁgurations of power between the various different players. The
decision to introduce RBAs in addition to RBCs and to ﬁnancially
support the former can, on the one hand, be interpreted as a step
towards strengthening public sector governance at the river basin
scale (see also Section 5.3). At the same time, the fact that RBCs are
not guaranteed any permanent ﬁnancial support from the state but
will probably mainly have to rely on a share of water and wastewa-
ter fees raises the question of how well the idea of stakeholder and
public participation via RBCs will play out in practice. It will hence
also depend on how much support the RBC members receive from
their respective employers for their work in the RBC. However, if
RBAs/RBCs do not deliver, this may lead to growing social dissatis-
faction (Mearns, 2004), which is likely to weaken the political legit-
imacy of RBAs and RBCs.
The observations on how the politics of scale of RBM plays out
in practice conﬁrm the importance of looking at scale as a process
(Jonas, 2006; Norman et al., 2012), and not (only) as the outcome of
a process. While one might think that the creation of the RBCs was
a result of the negotiations over the appropriate scale of water gov-
ernance, this decision was in fact only the starting point for further
negotiations on the concrete design and inﬂuence of this new scale
of decision-making. This also corroborates MacKinnon’s (2010)
observation that reform processes in the water sector may be
about scale, but that they are also ﬁrst and foremost about the
design of institutions and processes. It conﬁrms his scalar politics
approach (MacKinnon, 2010) with particular projects and initia-
tives having scalar aspects and repercussions – just as, for example,
the conﬂicts over the RBC’s composition in some basins led to the
reformulation of the general regulation on the number of seats in
the RBCs. However, a detailed reﬂection on institutional design is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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speciﬁc processes and practices of RBM were at least as much
debated, questioned and negotiated as the choice of the scale as
such. These debates take place at different scales, at the national
level within the government and between the ministries as well
as between the MEGD and the (former) Water Authority; at the
local level between members of the RBC and the local government
but also between them (for instance when the MEGD consults the
local governments for the nomination of the RBCs). This also
conﬁrms Swyngedouw’s (2010: 21) observation that: ‘‘The politics
of scale (. . .) necessitates a careful negotiation of the tensions, con-
ﬂicts, and contradictions within and between scalar formations’’
(highlighted by the authors).
5.3. River basins as the adequate scale for water governance in
Mongolia?
Our third question was whether river basins can be considered
as an adequate scale for water governance in Mongolia. The deci-
sion for the introduction of river basin governance and the creation
of RBCs in the Water Law of 2004 can be interpreted to illustrate a
political will to strengthen both decentralized and participatory
water governance at the scale of the river basin. However, due to
legal and ﬁnancial uncertainties (and maybe also limited aware-
ness about the river basin as an action unit), until 2012 this partic-
ipatory approach could only very partially be implemented where
donors facilitated the councils’ work. Furthermore, even where
RBCs were established, the goal of public participation in water
management was watered down by the compositions of RBCs. In
addition, it was difﬁcult to feed the results back into local policy-
making since the RBC did not rely on a strong legal and political
status (WWF 2012, pers. comm.) and given the local governments’
limited room to maneuver.
In fact, the incomplete decentralization process in Mongolia has
to be seen as an important factor for the limited role of RBCs up to
now since it also led to weak administrative capacities for water
management at the sub-national level. So far, there has been no
sub-national water administration, but water management was
covered by provincial and district environmental departments,
which were understaffed, and whose skills, equipment, and ﬁnan-
cial resources were very limited. In addition, there were serious
problems with law enforcement. This was compounded by limited
budgets at provincial and district levels for water resources man-
agement and by the dominance of the mining, agriculture and con-
struction sectors and the lack of intersectoral coordination. Hence,
in actual fact, there was a vacuum of administrative capacities for
water management at the sub-national level.
In 2012, the decision was taken to strengthen the sub-national
level through river basin governance by introducing RBAs in addi-
tion to RBCs, instead of setting up water administrations at prov-
ince and district level. As argued in Section 2, from a theoretical
perspective, the former have the advantage that they are more con-
ducive towards addressing problems of ﬁt between hydrological
and administrative boundaries, while the latter may have im-
proved institutional interplay at the level of political jurisdictions
(Moss, 2003). Furthermore, for political jurisdictions it is easier
to ensure democratic legitimacy and accountabilities (Warner
et al., 2008). While in settings where a strong water administration
is already in place at the scale of existing jurisdictions this may
speak against the introduction of RBM, one can argue that, given
the administrative deﬁciencies in Mongolia, there was the possibil-
ity to go either way.
However, now that the decision for RBAs has been made, it will
be very important to provide them with a sufﬁcient mandate,
resources and skilled staff to enable them to fulﬁll their functions.
This also includes reaching a decision on future water andwastewater prices and progress in revenue collection – also as a
means to establishing accountability mechanisms at the river ba-
sin-level.
While the introduction of RBAs appears to be a useful step to
strengthen administrative capacities for water management at
the sub-national level, it could be that the prior commitment to
participatory water management at the basin level is now losing
signiﬁcance with the creation of the RBAs as public bodies. In that
respect it is somewhat unfortunate that RBCs will not receive any
regular ﬁnancial support from the state at all. However, RBCs are a
potential means to ensure transparency, accountability and the
democratic legitimacy of RBM. Therefore, it will be important that
they will be reestablished as envisioned in the 2012 Water Law.
As mentioned in Section 2, water governance is intimately
linked to its political context and, as Moss and Newig (2010:3)
point out: ‘‘(. . .) problems of scale relate to fundamental questions
of democratic legitimacy’’. Rescaling can potentially lead to in-
creased participation, empowerment and democratization and
thereby also favor a new relationship between the state and its cit-
izens in Mongolia. It expresses a shift not only from central to
decentralized governance, but also from top-down approaches to
a more participatory and integrated decision-making. Investing
in efﬁcient decentralization and strengthening accountability
through participation in water governance is therefore also an
investment in the credibility and legitimacy of the democratic sys-
tem (for a more detailed analysis of this aspect see Houdret et al.,
in press).
Overall, the usefulness of the river basin as a governance scale
in Mongolia thus depends very much on the exact design of further
by-laws envisioned and on how the provisions of the 2012 Water
Law and respective by-laws will be implemented. A clear sharing
of responsibilities and competencies between the different institu-
tions in water governance is particularly important. This concerns
several issues of discontent between Mongol Os and the MEGD, be-
tween the NWC and the Water Council, and between future NWC
ﬁlial-committees and the RBAs/RBCs.
Furthermore, it will also rely on the pro-active communication
and coordination among the various bodies involved in water man-
agement, in that RBCs can play a crucial role, but require the means
to do so. A key question also pertains to the future role of the Min-
istry of the Environment and Green Development as such with
respect to other strong players such as the mining industry at
the national and local levels: basin agencies can only be as effective
as the national consensus between sector ministries.6. Conclusions
The institutionalization of River Basin Management (RBM) can
be characterized as ‘politics of scale’ where a new governance scale
is created in a process of political negotiations. This article has ana-
lyzed how the politics of scale play out in the institutionalization of
RBM using the case of Mongolia. It has furthermore scrutinized the
role of the broader context of political transition and decentraliza-
tion for RBM, an issue that has so far received little attention in the
relevant literature. Finally, the article has assessed whether the
basin scale is an adequate water management scale in Mongolia.
The analysis shows that the institutionalization of RBM in Mon-
golia is indeed a highly political ongoing process of ‘scalar politics’.
Initial provisions on the establishment of river basin councils in the
Water Law of 2004 as stakeholder fora had limited effect and gave
rise to more negotiations about the detailed design of RBM. As a
result, it was decided in the 2012 Water Law that publicly funded
river basin administrations would be established in addition to
RBCs and that some of the tasks of RBCs would be shifted to the
RBAs. The creation of RBAs can, on the one hand, be understood
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administrative capacities for water management at the sub-
national level. These are to be supported by RBCs as bodies for
coordination and public participation. However, given that the lat-
ter have no ﬁnancial basis, the question remains as to how effective
they will in fact be. In addition, a number of issues regarding RBAs
and RBCs still need to be deﬁned in by-laws. Hence, the 2012
Water Law can only be interpreted as an intermediate step in the
institutionalization of river basin governance in Mongolia. While
the river basin has the potential to become an adequate scale for
water management in Mongolia, this will very much depend on
how some key outstanding issues, such as the clariﬁcation of mon-
itoring and enforcement tasks or the detailed provisions on the
ﬁnancing of RBAs through water-pricing and their implementation
will look like.
Further, this paper has demonstrated that the institutionaliza-
tion of RBM in Mongolia is part of a wider overall process of the
rescaling of water governance among different water-using sec-
tors, among differing levels of government, and between existing
jurisdictions and the river basin. This process is furthermore
embedded into and strongly dependent on the overall process of
political and economic transition. It was in particular the incom-
plete political decentralization that hampered the successful
decentralization of water management and the introduction of
RBM in the period 2004–2012. The main reason was that the
decentralization has so far been limited to the devolution of tasks
but excluded ﬁscal competencies. The situation has improved with
the integrated Budget Law of 2011 according to which ﬁnancial
allocations to local governments will be increased. As such, it
seems that broader political reforms were indeed a prerequisite
for improvements in the water sector. Nevertheless, the successful
implementation of water management measures will also depend
on the extent to which these budgets will be allocated by local
communities and governments for water-management tasks.
However, the ﬁnding that the processes of political decentral-
ization and transition strongly affect the implementation of RBM
in Mongolia stands in stark contrast to the existing literature, in
which the general governance environment in which RBM is
implemented is often taken as being a stable environment and
an independent variable. Further research is therefore needed on
how different contextual factors and their changing nature inﬂu-
ence RBM.
Moreover, comparative studies of the political economies at play
would facilitate a deeper understanding of the institutionalization
of RBM in the context of broader governance changes. For example,
emerging new elites and alliances as well as their interests and
resources may have an important inﬂuence on the politics of power
at play in RBM. This would also allow for greater insights into the
links between water governance and what Harris and Alatout
(2010: 154) call ‘‘the construction of a nation-state and associated
visions of territoriality and government’’. Ultimately, this could also
contribute to improved policy-making, if the rescaling of water gov-
ernance builds more explicitly upon other governance processes.
Case studies from all over the world conﬁrm that the institu-
tionalization of RBM takes time and that a hasty implementation
may do more harm than good (Kemper et al., 2010). This is also
due to the fact that implementing RBM is at least as much a gover-
nance issue and a question of power reconﬁguration as it is a mat-
ter of technical and procedural arrangements. However, political
commitment in this process that endures the temporal power
struggles is a key to success. In spite of the difﬁculties mentioned,
the successive reforms of the Mongolian water sector, including
the most recent water laws, point to an increasing political com-
mitment which now needs to be translated into practice and for
which a certain stability and continuity of the newly created insti-
tutions and organizations will be needed.Acknowledgements
This work was supported by funding from the German Federal
Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) within the framework
of the projects ‘‘MoMo – Integrated Water Resources Management
in Central Asia – Model Region Mongolia (Grant UFZ-033L003A)
and ‘‘IWAS – International Water Research Alliance Saxony’’ (Grant
02WM1027). Christoph Görg inspired us to analyze the institution-
alization of River Basin Management in Mongolia through a ‘poli-
tics of scale’ perspective. The paper has also greatly beneﬁted
from the constructive comments of two anonymous reviewers.References
Allan, T., 2003. IWRM/IWRAM: A Sanctioned Discourse? School of African and
Oriental Studies, London School of Economics, London.
Armitage, D., 2008. Governance and the commons in a multi-level world. Int. J.
Commons 2 (1), 7–32.
Basandorj, D., Singh, S., 2008. Restoring the Image of Blue Mongolia – Rural Water
Supply and Sanitation, UNICEF/UNDP, Ulaanbaatar.
Batima, P., Natsagdorj, L., Gombluudev, P., Erdenetsetseg, B., 2005. Observed
Climate Change in Mongolia. AIACC Working Papers, Ulaanbataar.
Boyle, M., 2002. Cleaning up after the Celtic Tiger: scalar ‘ﬁxes’ in the political
ecology of Tiger economies. Trans. Inst. Brit. Geogr. 27, 172–194.
Conca, K., 2006. Governing Water. Contentious Transnational Politics and Global
Institution Building, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Dinar, A. et al., 2005. Decentralization of river basin management: a global analysis.
Dixit, A., Kusum, A., Mollinga, P. (Eds.), 2006. Integrated Water Resources
Management. Global Theory, Emerging Practice and Local Needs. SAGE
Publications. p. 404.
Dolgorsuren, G., Bron, J., van der Linden, W., 2012. Integrated Water Management
National Assessment Report. Part II. Government of Mongolia/Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Dombrowsky, I., 2005. Integriertes Wasserressourcen-Management als
Koordinationsproblem. In: Neubert, S., Scheumann, W., Edig, A.v., Huppert, W.
(Eds.), Integriertes Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM). Ein Konzept in die
Praxis überführen. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp. 61–82.
Dombrowsky, I. et al., 2010. How widely applicable is river basin management? An
analysis of wastewater management in an arid transboundary case. Environ.
Manage. 45 (5), 1112–1126.
Feitelson, E., Fischhendler, I., 2009. Spaces of water governance: the case of Israel
and its neighbors. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 99 (4), 728–745.
Fischhendler, I., 2008. Institutional conditions for IWRM: the Israeli case. Ground
Water 46 (1), 91–102.
Görg, C., 2007. Landscape governance: the ‘‘politics of scale’’ and the ‘‘natural’’
conditions of places. Geoforum 38 (5), 954–966.
Harris, L.M., Alatout, S., 2010. Negotiating hydro-scales, forging states: comparison
of the upper Tigris/Euphrates and Jordan River basins. Polit. Geogr. 29, 148–156.
Hartje, V., 2002. International Dimensions of Integrated Water Management. In: Al
Baz, I., Hartje, V., Scheumann, W. (Eds.), Co-operation on Transboundary Rivers.
Nomos, Baden-Baden, p. 7–34.
Horlemann, L., Dombrowsky, I., 2012. Institutionalising IWRM in developing and
transition countries: the case of Mongolia. Environ. Earth Sci. 65 (5), 1547–
1559.
Houdret, A., Dombrowsky, I., Horlemann, L., in press. Evolving River Basin
Management in Mongolia? In: Huitema, D., Meijerink, S. (Eds.), The politics of
River Basin Organizations. Edward Elgar, Chatham.
Howitt, R., 2000. Nests, webs and constructs: contested concepts of scale in political
geography. In: Agnew, J., Mitchell, K., Tuathail, G. (Eds.), A Companion to
Political Geography. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 138–157.
Huitema, D., Meijerink, S. (Eds.), in press. The politics of river basin organizations.
Coalitions, institutional design choices and consequences. Edward Elgar,
Chatham.
Jamsranjav, C., 2009. Sustainable Rangeland Management in Mongolia: The Role of
Herder Community Institutions. United Nations University, Reykjavik.
Janzen, J., Priester, M., Chinbat, B., Battsengel, V., 2007. Artisanal and Small-Scale
Mining in Mongolia. Faculty of Earth Sciences, National University of Mongolia,
Center for Development Research, Ulaanbaatar.
Jonas, A.E., 2006. Pro scale: further reﬂections on the ‘scale debate’ in human
geography. Trans. Inst. Brit. Geogr. 31 (3), 399–406.
Kemper, K., Blomquist, W., Dinar, A., 2010. Integrated River Basin Management
through Decentralization. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg.
Livingstone, A., Erdenechimeg, C., Oyunsuvd, A., 2009. Needs Assessment on
Institutional Capacity for Water Governance in Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar.
Lkhagvadorj, A., 2010. Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization in Mongolia.
Universitätsverlag Potsdam, Potsdam.
Lkhagvadorj, A., 2012. Analysis on Mongolia’s Integrated Budget Law. Swiss
Development Cooperation in Mongolia, Ulan Batar.
MacKinnon, D., 2010. Reconstructing scale: towards a new scalar politics. Prog.
Hum. Geogr. 35 (1), 21–36.
2404 A. Houdret et al. / Journal of Hydrology 519 (2014) 2392–2404Malsy, M., Beek, T.A.d., Eisner, S., Flörke, M., 2012. Climate change impacts on
Central Asian water resources. Adv. Geosci. 32, 77–83.
Marston, S., 2000. The social construction of scale. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 24 (2), 219–
242.
Meadowcroft, J., 2002. Politics and scale: some implications for environmental
governance. Landscape Urban Plann. 61, 169–179.
Mearns, R., 2004. Decentralisation, rural livelihoods and pasture-land management
in post-socialist Mongolia. Eur. J. Dev. Res. 16 (1), 133–152.
Menzel, L., et al., 2008. Hydrological impact of climate and land-use change –
results from the MoMo project. In: International Conference on Uncertainties in
Water Resource Management: causes, technologies and consequences,
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Merrey, D.J., 2008. Is normative integrated water resources management
implementable? Charting a practical course with lessons from Southern
Africa. Phys. Chem. Earth 33 (8–13), 899–905.
Merrey, D.J., Cook, S., 2012. Fostering institutional creativity at multiple levels:
Towards facilitated institutional bricolage. Water Altern. 5 (1), 1–19.
Mody, J., 2004. Achieving Accountability through Decentralization: Lessons for
Integrated River Basin Management. 3346, Washington, DC.
Mollinga, P.P., 2008. Water Policy – Water Politics. Water Politics and Development
Cooperation, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 2–29.
Moss, T., 2003. Solving problems of ‘ﬁt’ at the expense of problems of ‘interplay’?
The spatial reorganisation of water management following the EU water
framework directive. In: Breit, H., Engels, A., Moss, T., Troja, M. (Eds.), How
Institutions Change – Perspectives on Social Learning in Global and Local
Environmental Contexts. Leske + Budrich, Opladen, pp. 85–122.
Moss, T., 2004. The governance of land use in river basins, prospects for overcoming
problems of institutional interplay with the EU Water Framework Directive.
Land Use Policy 21, 85–94.
Moss, T., Newig, J., 2010. Multilevel water governance and problems of scale: setting
the stage for a broader debate. Environ. Manage. 46 (1), 1–6.
Mostert, E. (Ed.), 2000. River Basin Management. International Workshop on River
Basin Management. In: Proceedings of the International Workshop on River
Masin Management, 27–29 October 1999, The Hague, the Netherlands.
UNESCO, Paris.
Neumann, R.P., 2009. Political ecology: theorizing scale. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 33 (3),
398–406.
Norman, E.S., Bakker, K., Cook, C., 2012. Introduction to the themed section: water
governance and the politics of scale. Water Altern. 5 (1), 52–61.
Olson, M., 1969. The principle of ‘‘ﬁscal equivalence’’: the division of responsibilities
among different levels of government. Am. Econ. Assoc., 479–487.Ostrom, E., 1999. Coping with tragedies of the commons. Annu. Rev. Pol. Sci. 2, 493–
535.
Perramond, E.P., 2012. The politics of scaling water governance and adjudication in
New Mexico. Water Altern. 5 (1), 62–82.
Priess, J.A., Schweitzer, C., Wimmer, F., Batkhishig, O., Mimler, M., 2011. The
consequences of land-use change and water demands in Central Mongolia. Land
Use Policy 28 (1), 4–10.
Saravanan, S., McDonald, G.T., Mollinga, P., 2009. Critical review of integrated water
resources management: moving beyond polarised discourse. Nat. Resour.
Forum 33, 76–86.
Schlager, E., Blomquist, W., 2008. Embracing Watershed Politics. University Press of
Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, USA.
Steckling, N. et al., 2011. Mercury exposure in female artisanal small-scale gold
miners (ASGM) in Mongolia: an analysis of human biomonitoring (HBM) data
from 2008. Sci. Total Environ. 409, 994–1000.
Steiner-Khamsi, G., Stolpe, I., 2004. Decentralisation and recentralisation reform in
Mongolia: tracing the swing of the pendulum. Comp. Educ. 40 (1), 29–53.
Swyngedouw, E., 1997. Neither Global nor Local – ‘‘Glocalization’’ and the Politics of
Scale. In: Cox, K.R. (Ed.), Spaces of Globalization. The Guilford Press, New York/
London, pp. 137–166.
Swyngedouw, E., 1999. Modernity and hybridity: nature, regeneracionismo, and the
production of the Spanish waterscape. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 89 (1), 443–465.
Swyngedouw, E., 2010. Place, Nature and the Question of Scale. Interrogating the
Production of Nature, Berlin.
Thiel, A., Egerton, C., 2011. Re-scaling of resource governance as institutional
change: the case of water governance in Portugal. J. Environ. Planning Manage.
54 (3), 383–402.
Tortell, P., Borjigdkhan, A., Naidansuren, E., 2008. Institutional Structures for
Environmental Management in Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar and Wellington.
United Nations Environment Programme, 2012. The UN-Water Status Report on the
Application of Integrated Approaches to Water Resources Management. UNEP/
UNDP/Global Water Partnership/SIWI/UNEP DHI-Center, Nairobi.
Warner, J., Wester, P., Bolding, A., 2008. Going with the ﬂow: river basins as natural
units for water management? Water Policy 10 (2), 121–138.
Mongolia, W.W.F., 2007. Freshwater Issues in Mongolia and WWF Mongolia’s
planned contribution towards a solution. WWF Mongolia Programme Ofﬁce,
Ulaanbaatar.
Ykhanbai, H., Bulgan, E., 2006. Co-management of Pastureland in Mongolia. In:
Tyler, S. (Ed.), Communities, Livelihoods, and Natural Resources. Action
Research and Policy Change in Asia, International Development Research
Centre, Warwickshire/Ottawa, pp. 107–128.
